Abstract. In this paper, we propose a simple scheme which produces a new S-box from a given S-box. We use the well-known conversion technique between the polynomial functions over F2n and the boolean functions from F n 2 to F2. We have applied the scheme to Rijndael S-box and obtained 29 new S-boxes, of which only one is a bijection with better algebraic expression than the original Rijndael S-box and has the same spectral properties as the original Rijndael S-box. All others turned out to be non-bijective, and have different spectral properties, and hence, they all are inequivalent to the original as boolean functions.
Introduction
It is widely known that the properties of substitution box (S-box) are fundamental to the secrecy of symmetric encryption algorithms after Shannon [10] . Since S-boxes are usually implemented as look up tables, they are attractive for fast software encryption algorithms [3] . Most of popular block ciphers and some of stream ciphers have adopted various S-boxes and a lot of research has been given to designing "better" S-boxes.
There have been proposed [3] several methods to generate cryptographically useful S-boxes, such as the selection of nearly optimal (for differential [2] and linear [9] attacks) boolean functions as components of the S-boxes, random generation, using finite field operations and heuristic algorithms. Among these, finite field power operation based S-boxes achieve [3] several security criteria simultaneously, and have been used in many cipher proposals including Rijndael [14, 15] , major portfolio of NESSIE [19] , ARIA [17] in Korea, and CRYPTREC [18] in Japan, mentioned only a few.
Rijndael was selected as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the US NIST in October 2000, and published as in November 2001.
Rijndael S-box is the finite field inversion together with a bitwise affine transformation. Until Rijndael was selected as AES, it was generally claimed that such S-box would prevent algebraic attacks. There have been some progress in the research of algebraic aspect of Rijndael S-box. It is known [13, 3, 7] that every component function of Rijndael S-box is a single term trace function on finite field GF(256), and has a property of algebraic linear redundancy that is inherent in finite field exponentiation. At the same time, researchers successively have proposed several improved S-boxes. In [7] , the research effort has focused on the S-boxes with no simple algebraic expression while Fuller and Millan in [3] concentrates on the S-boxes with no linear redundancy. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first introduce some background materials including one-to-one correspondence between the polynomial functions over a finite field and the boolean functions. Some definitions which are frequently used in the cryptanalysis of boolean functions will also be given. Section 3 describes the design scheme which produces a new S-box from a given S-box working on 4-bit inputs and outputs. We apply this scheme in Section 4 to Rijndael S-box and obtain 29 new S-boxes, of which only one is a bijection with better algebraic expression than the original Rijndael S-box and has the same spectral properties as the original Rijndael S-box. All others turned out to be non-bijective, and have different spectral properties, and hence, they all are inequivalent to the original as boolean functions. We give some concluding remarks and open problems in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Sequences, Trace-Represented Polynomial Functions and Boolean Functions
Let F 2 n be a finite field with 2 n elements and a = {a t } N −1 t=0 be a sequence over F 2 of period N = 2 n − 1. Let α be a primitive element in F 2 n . The discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of a is defined as
Its inverse formula is given as follows:
For a given sequence a, there exists a polynomial function f (x) from F 2 n to F 2 , associated with a, such that a t = f (α t ), t = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. We write a ↔ f , and call a as an evaluation of the function f at α. By the inverse DFT or Lagrange interpolation, we have [5] :
where Γ (N ) is the set of cyclotomic coset leaders modulo N with respect to 2, C j is the coset which contains j, n j = |C j |, T r nj 1 (x) is the trace [8] function from F 2 n j to F 2 , and A j ∈ F 2 n j is the DFT coefficient of a. Then the sum of trace functions of (1) is a desired polynomial function and called the trace representation of sequence a. Now, let g(x n−1 , · · · , x 0 ) be a boolean function in n-variables. By applying the Lagrange interpolation, its polynomial representation f (x) of g(x n−1 , · · · , x 0 ) can be determined as: (x is just indeterminant)
where λ = n−1 i=0 x i α i , and {α 0 , · · · , α n−1 } is a basis of F 2 n over F 2 , denoted by
A conversion from a polynomial function to a boolean function is given by
In the rest of this paper, by a boolean function f in n variables, we mean two
Transform Domain Analysis Tools
For transform domain analysis of cryptographic functions, see Gong and Golomb [4] , for example. The following definitions are mainly from [5, Ch. 6 and 10] with the same notation as above. For a ↔ f (x), the Hadamard transform (HT) of a or f (x) is defined by
The Walsh transform of a boolean function f (x) is defined by
The Hadamard transform of f (x) and the Walsh transform of f (x) have the relation:
Nonlinearity N f of a boolean function f in n variables is defined as
where d(x, y) denotes the Hamming distance between x and y, and is calculated using Hadamard transform of f :
The Avalanche transform (AT) or additive correlation (convolution) of f (x) is defined by
Avalanche transform analysis of cryptographic functions was first introduced by Webster and Tavares [12] . We say that a boolean function f satisfies Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) if its Avalanche transform F (w) = 0 for all w with binary hamming weight wt(w) = 1.
Equivalence Classes of Boolean Functions
Let f and g be two boolean functions in n-variables. If there exist a non-singular binary matrix D of order n, two n-tuple binary vectors a and b, and a binary constant c such that for all
denotes a linear function selected by b, then f and g are said to be (affine) equivalent [3] .
The absolute values of the Hadamard transform and the correlation transform are both re-arranged by affine transform and thus nonlinearity of a boolean function is unchanged under affine transform [3] .
Description of Rijndael S-Box
An n-bit processing substitution box is a a vector valued boolean function 
We take b i = α i for 0 ≤ i < 8 where α is a root of z 8 + z 4 + z 3 + z 1 + 1, which is the defining irreducible (but not primitive) polynomial of F = F 2 8 for the Rijndael cipher. This transforms eight boolean functions into eight polynomial functions from F to F 2 , which are
where β = α + 1 is a primitive element of F , and
The above algebraic expressions of component functions s i (x) have been determined by Inverse DFT or Lagrange interpolation (2), dual basis approach [13] , or qpolynomial method [7] .
Proposed Scheme of Designing a New S-Box from a Given S-Box
We will describe a proposed scheme of designing a new S-box from a given one. For convenience, we explain using a smaller size example, e.g., over F 2 4 . Consider the following S-box denoted as SB-0 (the left-most one in Table 1 ), defined by s(x) = x −1 over the field F = F 2 4 using the irreducible polynomial g 0 (z) = z 4 + z 3 + z 2 + z + 1. Then, the following algorithm produces SB-1 and SB-2 in the middle and right-most in Table 1 , respectively. Table 1 . Three S-boxes (in hexadecimal) 00 01 10 11 00 01 10 11 00 01 10 11 00 0 1 f a 00 0 1 a f 00 0 c 7 0 01 8 6 5 9 01 6 8 5 9 01 6 7 4 7 10 4 7 3 e 10 2 b d c 10 e 2 e 6 11 d c b 2 11 3 e 7 4 11 8 a 5 a
Polynomial functions for each of the 4 coordinate boolean functions of SB-0 over F can be found using Lagrange interpolation explained in Section 2:
where
, α is a root of g 0 (z) which is the defining polynomial of F , and β = 1 + α is a primitive element of F . Now, we let K be the field defined by g 1 (z) = z 4 + z 3 + 1. Then the polynomial functions of SB-0 over K are determined as
and γ is a root of g 1 (z). To obtain polynomial functions for the new S-box, which we call SB-1, we simply replace the coefficients (some powers of γ in (9)) with the corresponding powers of β. This gives new polynomial functions from (9) , which are
Finally, to construct SB-1 shown in the middle of Table 1 , we evaluate the above polynomial functions over F = F 2 4 with multiplication mod g 0 (z).
There is another irreducible polynomial of degree 4 over F 2 , which is g 2 (z) = z 4 + z + 1. We denote E by the field defined by g 2 (z). Then, similarly, over E, the polynomial functions of SB-0 are determined as
and δ is a root of g 2 (z). By replacing δ in (10) with β, we obtain another set of polynomial functions from (10):
This, in turn, gives a third S-box, SB-2, shown in the right-most of Table 1 , when we evaluate the above polynomial functions over F = F 2 4 with multiplication mod g 0 (z).
Remark 1.
Observe that SB-1 is a bijection but SB-2 is not. The reason why they are so different would be a topic of further research.
Remark 2.
A simple calculation shows that all three S-boxes in Table 1 have the same spectral properties. That is, they have the same profiles of Hadamard transform and Avalanche transform, where the transform is applied to each of the coordinate boolean functions. It turned out that the spectral properties do not have to be all the same when this scheme is applied to larger S-boxes, which we will discuss in the next section.
Application of Proposed Scheme to Rijndael S-Box
Using z
We apply the proposed design scheme explained in Section 3 to the original Rijndael S-box, which we denote by BOX-0. From now on, we use the parallel notations in Section 3, but g 0 (z) and g 1 (z) are changed to:
where g 0 (z) is the defining polynomial of F 2 8 for the Rijndael cipher and g 1 (z) is a primitive polynomial of degree 8 over F 2 .
Recall that the polynomial functions s i (x), 0 ≤ i < 8, for the coordinate boolean functions of BOX-0 were determined as in (7) over F = F 2 8 defined by g 0 (z), where β = 1 + α is a primitive element of F , where α is a root of g 0 (z), and where γ is a root of g 1 (z) in this section, and is a primitive element of K. For the other r i (x), see Table 2 . The first and second column of Table 2 represents cyclotomic coset leaders and sizes, respectively. The values in the third column are the exponents of the coefficients of x k in the trace representation of r 7 (x), with the convention of γ ∞ = 0, where γ is a primitive element in K. The bottom row of Table 2 shows the number of nonzero terms in each r i (x). Note that these values are very large (255 is the maximum) compared to that of the expression in (7). By replacing the coefficients (which are the powers of γ in (11)) with the corresponding powers of β, as described in Section 3, we obtain a set of 8 new polynomial functions h i (x), 0 ≤ i < 8, one of which is 
where β = 1 + α is the primitive element of F , where α is a root of g 0 (z). Now, evaluating these polynomials over F = F 2 8 with multiplication mod g 0 (z) gives a new S-box, BOX-1, shown in Table 3 . We now list some cryptographic properties of BOX-1 in parallel with those of BOX-0. We will use h i (x) in Table 2 for BOX-1 and s i (x) in (7) for BOX-0. has the term θx 127 in its trace representation for some nonzero θ ∈ F * 2 n . The ANF of any boolean function can be found by exhaustive "truth table summation" [11] . In fact, the number of linear and highest degree terms in the ANF of h i (x) and s i (x) turns out to be given as follows: h0 h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
Number of linear terms 4 3 4 4 6 3 3 3 6 4 6 4 6 2 4 4 Number of degree 7 terms 4 4 5 1 5 4 3 3 5 4 2 4 2 3 4 4 4. Since the linear span of a function or a sequence is just the number of nonzero terms in its polynomial function [5] , we have:
h0 h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
Linear span 255 255 242 254 254 255 247 254 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 8 5. Hadamard transform of a boolean function has a connection (5) with nonlinearity and with the first-order correlation immunity [11] . Hadamard transform profile of component functions of BOX-1 and BOX-0 are determined as: 8. It is interesting to observe that for all i = 0, 1, · · · , 7, h i and s i have the same Hadamard and Avalanche transform spectrum (as a profile), which is not an accident due to the following theorem. 
, and e i is either 1 or 0 as shown in (7), it is easily shown [3, Theorem 3] that s i and s j are equivalent for any 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 7.
Now it is enough to establish the affine equivalence between s 0 and h i for all i = 0, 1, · · · , 7. Some calculation shows that h 0 (x) = s 0 (D 0 x T ), where binary 8 × 8 square matrix D 0 is given as
where Since an affine transformation rearranges additive correlation values, the Avalanche transform of h i is possibly non-identical to that of s i . However, for w ∈ F 8 2 with binary Hamming weight one, the maximum absolute correlation value of (h i * h i )(w) is equal to that of (s j * s j )(w) for 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 7, and the frequency of occurrences of each possible values of both BOX-1 and BOX-0 are very similar. Therefore, BOX-1 and BOX-0 have almost the same level of performance in correlation aspect.
Using All Other Irreducible Polynomials of Degree 8
Analysis result of BOX-1, especially the items from 4 to 7 in the above list, and Theorem 1, shows that BOX-1 is equivalent to the original S-box of Rijndael in many aspects.
The effect of replacing the irreducible polynomial in Rijndael has been enough studied previously. Any replacement of irreducible polynomial in Rijndael cipher with different one can create a new cipher, but it is equivalent to the original in all aspects. Barkan and Biham [1] concluded that the arbitrary choice for the irreducible polynomial to be replaced works the same always, and hence, there is no advantage to changing the original irreducible polynomial with any other. Careless conclusion from the above information would lead to a guess that the remaining S-boxes, BOX-2, ... , BOX-29, using each of the remaining irreducible polynomials of degree 8, respectively, would have the similar properties. That is, every BOX-i for 2 ≤ i ≤ 29 might be a balanced bijection with the same spectral properties (the same Hadamard and correlation transform profile) and whose coordinate functions would be all affine equivalent to that of Rijndael S-box. To our surprise, it turned out that this is not the case. Careful examination of the proposed scheme described in Section 3 will reveal that our scheme is completely different from simply changing the irreducible polynomial in Rijndael cipher. Instead, it is a method of constructing only a new S-box from the given one, and the whole cipher runs over the field defined by the same irreducible polynomial.
For example, we examine BOX-2, which is constructed using the irreducible polynomial g 2 (z) = z 8 + z 5 + z 3 + z 1 + 1 in the conversion process. Again we use the parallel notations with Section 3, but in this case, we use the field E defined by g 2 (z). BOX-2 is shown in Table 4 . The polynomial functions for BOX-2 are denoted by u i (x), their Hadamard transform profiles and SAC table are given in Table 5 and Table 6 , respectively.
In summary, BOX-2 is completely different from BOX-1 or BOX-0:
1. BOX-2 is not bijective and no coordinate function is balanced. Therefore, it is worse against the linear attack than BOX-0. 2. BOX-2 has worse spectrum in transform domain than BOX-0. 3. The Hadamard transform profiles of the eight component functions of BOX-2 are all distinct. 4. All coordinate functions of BOX-2 are pairwise inequivalent as boolean functions, which is one of the desirable characteristics of an S-box. 5. None of the component functions of BOX-2 has a simple algebraic expression over F 2 n with the multiplication performed modulo any irreducible polynomial, while all coordinates of BOX-0 do have the simplest equations such as (7) with the current Rijndael irreducible polynomial. Therefore, BOX-2 is better against the interpolation attack [6] than the original S-box, BOX-0.
We have experimentally checked all the remaining 27 S-boxes which are constructed from Rijndael S-box using the remaining 27 irreducible polynomials of degree 8, respectively. We have verified that all these share almost the same properties listed above with BOX-2.
Concluding Remarks
We proposed a simple scheme which produces a new S-box from the given S-box, which are based on operations over F 2 n . The essential steps of the construction are (i) to determine the trace-represented polynomial functions of the given S-box over F 2 n with the multiplication performed modulo some other irreducible polynomial than the one originally used, (ii) to replace the coefficients in the tracerepresented polynomial functions with the corresponding powers of the original primitive element, and finally, (iii) to evaluate new polynomials in F 2 n with the multiplication now performed modulo the original irreducible polynomial.
We have applied the scheme to Rijndael S-box, BOX-0, and constructed 29 different S-boxes, denoted by BOX-1, BOX-2, ... , BOX-29. All 29 S-boxes have much improved algebraic expressions over F 2 n with the multiplication performed modulo the original irreducible polynomial g 0 (z) (compare with (7)). Only BOX-1 has almost the same cryptographic properties as BOX-0. It is because only BOX-1 is equivalent to BOX-0 as boolean functions. Only BOX-0 and BOX-1 have the property that the algebraic expressions over F 2 n with the multiplication performed modulo some appropriate irreducible polynomial turned out to consist of a single trace function. No other S-boxes have such a simple algebraic expression.
Some theoretical developments that would be interesting are the following:
Q1 When and why the resulting S-box is a bijection or not a bijection? Q2 When and why the resulting S-box has the same or different spectral properties as the original S-box? Q3 Restricting to the case of Rijndael S-box, why is only BOX-1 similar to the original S-box? This is very surprising considering that g 1 (z) is an arbitrary choice among 29 irreducible polynomials of degree 8 over F 2 . Q4 What are the distinctive properties of g 1 (z) = z 8 + z 4 + z 3 + z 2 + 1 relative to g 0 (z) = z 8 + z 4 + z 3 + z 1 + 1 compared with all other 28 irreducible polynomials of degree 8 over F 2 ?
